We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on linear prices, meaning that the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased. Equilibria for linear prices are known to be exactly the maximum Nash welfare allocations.
Introduction
In a market, buyers and sellers exchange goods according to some sort of pricing system. One of the most important concepts in the study of markets is market equilibrium, which describes when the supply provided by the sellers and the demands of the buyers exactly match. Market equilibrium theory dates back to Walras's seminal work in 1874 [32] . In 1954, Arrow and Debreu finally showed that a market equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for a wide class of utility functions [1] . This includes Leontief utilities, which will be our focus.
The simplest mathematical model of a market is a Fisher market, first proposed in 1891 by Irving Fisher (see [6] for a modern introduction). A Fisher market consists of a set of goods available for sale, and a set of agents, each with a fixed amount of money to spend. It is usually assumed that agents have no value for leftover money. In Fisher markets, each good j has a single real-number price p j , and the cost of buying some quantity x of good j is p j · x. We refer to such prices as linear, meaning that the cost is proportional to the quantity purchased. A market equilibrium assigns a price to each good such that when each agent purchases her favorite bundle of goods that is affordable under these prices, the demand exactly matches the supply.
There are three motivations behind this work. First, in real market economies, prices are often not linear, and depend on the quantity purchased 1 . We refer to prices of this form as price curves.
For example, "buying in bulk" may allow agents to purchase twice as much of some resource for less than twice the price. In this case, the marginal price decreases as more of the good is purchased. On the other hand, for a scarce resource, a central authority may choose to impose increasing marginal costs to ensure that no single individual can monopolize the resource. Israel's pricing policy for a water is a good example of this, where each additional unit of water costs more than the previous one [3] . A tremendous amount of work has been devoted to understanding the nature of linear prices, despite the pervasiveness of price curves in the real world. This paper attempts to ask the same fundamental questions of price curves that have been answered for linear prices.
Second, imagine a social planner or mechanism designer who wishes to design a pricing scheme that will maximize some objective function. The objective function of a social planner is typically referred to as welfare. There are many different social welfare functions, the most well studied being utilitarian welfare (the sum of agent utilities), Nash welfare (the product of agent utilities) [19, 16] , and max-min welfare (the minimum agent utility [24, 27, 28] ) 2 . Max-min welfare can be seen as caring only about equality across individuals. The utilitarian welfare measures overall good across the entire population, possibly at the expense of certain individuals. The Nash welfare is something of a compromise between these two extremes.
Eisenberg and Gale famously showed that for linear prices, the market equilibria correspond exactly to the allocations maximizing Nash welfare [10, 11] . This result is powerful, but also limiting: what if the social planner wishes to maximize a different welfare function? Is it possible that using price curves instead of linear prices allows a wider set of allocations to be equilibria? In particular, are there welfare functions other than Nash welfare such that welfare-maximizing allocations can always be supported by price curves? (We say that an allocation can be supported by price curves if there exist prices curves that make that allocation an equilibrium.) Our paper answers these questions in the affirmative.
The third motivation involves a more conceptual connection between markets and welfare functions, both of which have been extensively studied in the economics literature. We know that linearpricing equilibria correspond to maximizing Nash welfare, but does this connection go deeper? Our work hints at an affirmative answer to this question as well.
CES welfare functions
For any constant ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare function is given by i∈N u ρ i 1/ρ where u i is agent i's utility, and ρ ∈ R is the elasticity parameter. Setting ρ = 1 yields utilitarian welfare, and taking limits as ρ goes to −∞ and 0 yields max-min welfare and Nash welfare, respectively. This class of welfare functions was first proposed by Atkinson [2] , although he did not call it by the same name. The smaller ρ is, the more the social planner cares about individual equality (max-min welfare being the extreme case of this), and the larger ρ is, the more the social planner cares about overall societal good (utilitarian welfare being the extreme case of this). The CES welfare function (as opposed to the CES agent utility function) has received very little attention in the computational economics community, despite being well-studied in the traditional economics literature [2, 5] .
These welfare functions also admit an axiomatic characterization:
1. Monotonicity: if one agent's utility increases while all others are unchanged, the welfare function should prefer the new allocation.
2. Symmetry: the welfare function should treat all agents the same.
3. Continuity: the welfare function should be continuous. 4 . Independence of common scale: scaling all agent utilities by the same factor should not affect which allocations have better welfare than others.
5. Independence of unconcerned agents: when comparing the welfare of two allocations, the comparison should not depend on agents who have the same utility in both allocations.
6. The Pigou-Dalton principle: all things being equal, the welfare function should prefer more equitable allocations [8, 23] .
Up to monotonic transformations of the welfare function (which of course do not affect which allocations have better welfare than others), the set of welfare functions that satisfy these axioms is exactly the set of CES welfare functions with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], including Nash welfare [18] 3 . This axiomatic characterization shows that we are not just focusing on an arbitrary class of welfare functions: CES welfare functions really are the welfare functions.
Results and prior work
We assume throughout the paper that agents have Leontief utility functions. An agent with a Leontief utility function desires the goods in fixed proportions, e.g., one unit of CPU for every two units of RAM. We can express agent i's utility as min j∈M :w ij =0
x ij w ij where x ij is the amount of good j agent i receives, and w ij is agent i's (nonnegative) weight for good j. Although this definition may seem limiting, it subsumes network bandwidth allocation, where agents have Leontief utilities with w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j. Bandwidth allocation is a well-studied area in its own right (for example, the work of Kelly [17] on proportional fairness.).
Leontief utilities exhibit certain convenient properties that other utility functions do not. In particular, such an agent will always purchase her goods exactly in the same proportions, and all that changes is how much she purchases. We also assume that each agent has the same amount of money to spend. However, most of our results do extend to the case of unequal budgets, as noted later on.
We now describe our two main results.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of price curves. Section 4 presents our first main result, which concerns the first motivation described above: trying to understand fundamental properties of price curve equilibria. In particular, this section answers the following question: given some allocation, is there a way to tell whether there exist price curves that make this allocation an equilibrium? Furthermore, can such price curves be efficiently computed?
The answer boils down to a property we call group-domination-freeness. Roughly, a set of agents a group-dominates a set of agents b if these sets are the same weight, but for every good j and every threshold τ ∈ R ≥0 , the number of agents in a receiving at least of τ of good j is at least as large as the number of agents in b receiving at least τ of good j. The formal definition of group domination is given in Section 4. An allocation is group-domination-free (GDF) if no group dominates any other group. We show that an allocation can be supported by strictly increasing price curves if and only if the allocation is GDF (Theorem 4.3) 4 . This characterization results in a polynomial time algorithm to compute the underlying price curves or show that none exist (Theorem 4.4). Appendix A gives an analogous characterization theorem and polynomial time algorithm for weakly increasing price curves (Theorems A. 2 and A.3) .
Although the definition of group domination may seem slightly technical, we also demonstrate its relation to the concept of stochastic dominance, and argue that it may in fact be interpreted as a fairness notion. The stochastic dominance interpretation will also suggest that group domination is quite a strong property, and hence group-domination-freeness is a quite a weak assumption.
The proof of these characterization theorems involves the construction of a special matrix we call the agent-order matrix A, which is a function of the allocation. We show that existence of strictly increasing price curves is captured by strongly positive solutions (every entry of the solution vector is positive) to Ay = 0. We relate group-domination-freeness to a property of this matrix, and then invoke a duality theorem equivalent to Farkas's Lemma [22] to complete the proof. The algorithm for computing price curves is a linear program involving the agent-order matrix.
Maximum CES welfare allocations can be supported in bandwidth allocation. Our second main result concerns the second and third motivations: a social planner who wishes to maximize a welfare function other than Nash welfare, and understanding the connection between markets and welfare functions. We know that the maximum Nash welfare allocations can be supported by linear prices. If we allow price curves, are there other welfare functions whose maxima can be supported? First, will need some assumption on the agents' weights. To see this, consider just two agents and one good. Since the agents have the same budget, they must receive equal amounts of the good no matter the price curve. However, if one agent derives less utility per unit of the good, this allocation doesn't maximize any CES welfare function except for Nash welfare 5 .
One natural assumption would be to normalize the agents' weight vectors under some normwe discuss such results in the following section. However, we begin with the simpler assumption that w ij ∈ {0, 1} for every agent i and good j. This means that each agent has some set of goods she desires, and she desires all of those goods in the same proportion. This corresponds to the wellstudied bandwidth allocation setting, where each good corresponds to a link in a network. Each agent wishes to transmit some data along a fixed path of links, and thus desires bandwidth for exactly those links in equal proportion.
In this setting, price curves correspond naturally to a signaling mechanism that provides congestion signals (eg. in the form of a packet mark or drop) and an end-point protocol such as TCP [7] corresponds naturally to agent responses. While it was understood that different marking schemes (such as RED and CHOKe [13, 21] and variants of TCP lead to different social welfare objectives (eg. [20] ), a market-based understanding was developed only for Nash Welfare, starting with the seminal work of Kelly et al. [17] .
Our second main result is that in the bandwidth allocation setting, the welfare-maximizing allocations for any fixed CES welfare function with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) can be supported by price agent 1 agent 2 agent 3  good 1  1  0  1  good 2  0  1  1   Example 1: A bandwidth allocation instance where no maximum utilitarian welfare allocation can be supported. The table above gives each agent's weight w ij ∈ {0, 1} for each good. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by giving all of good 1 to agent 1 and all of good 2 to agent 2, leaving agent 3 with nothing. This is impossible to support with price curves, because agent 3 can always buy a nonzero amount of the goods she wants.
curves (Theorem 6.1). We prove this by writing a convex program to maximize CES welfare, and using duality to construct explicit price curves. Furthermore, these price curves take on a natural form: the cost of buying x of good j is q j x 1−ρ , where q j ≥ 0 is a constant derived from the dual 6 . One may wonder if Theorem 6.1 could be extended to ρ = 1, i.e., utilitarian welfare. Example 1 shows that the answer is no, unfortunately. One may also wonder if Theorem 6.1 would generalize if we relax our constraint from w ij ∈ {0, 1} to w ij ∈ [0, 1]. The answer is again no; this counterexample is more involved and is given by Theorem C.1 in Section C.
Additional results
We prove several additional results. We consider max-min welfare in Section 5, and show that as long as agents' weights are reasonably normalized, allocations with optimal max-min welfare can be supported. In Appendix B, we use the characterization theorem for weakly increasing price curves (Theorem A.2) to prove several results about CES welfare functions. First, we provide an alternative proof of the bandwidth setting result (although this proof only holds for ρ < 0). We then show that for two agents whose weights are normalized in any reasonable way, any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported. We also show that when agents' weights are normalized with respect to ρ itself, any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported. These arguments are quite technically involved, with L'Hôpital's rule making a surprising cameo appearance.
Prior work
The study of markets has a long histories in the economics literature [32, 30, 1, 6] . Recently, this topic has received significant attention in the computer science community as well (see [31] for an algorithmic exposition). The vast majority of the literature has focused on linear prices, but there are some papers that consider more complex pricing schemes. One such paper is [14] , which showed that for linear but fully personalized prices (i.e., we can independently assign different prices to different agents for the same good), one can support any Pareto optimal allocation. One drawback of fully personalized prices is that we lose any claim to fairness, since agents may be subjected to totally different prices for the same resource. Price curves are personalized in a much weaker sense: the cost of a good depends only on how much you buy of that good, not on who you are or how much you buy of another good.
The concept of a social welfare function -a function which encapsulates a societal value system -was first proposed in 1938 [4] , and further developed by [25] . For brevity, we will just refer to them as welfare functions. Since then, several different welfare functions have been proposed, the most well-studied being utilitarian welfare, Nash welfare [19, 16] , and max-min welfare (the minimum agent utility) [24, 27, 28] . The class of CES welfare functions was first proposed by [2] 6 These results extend to agents with unequal budgets if we instead consider the "budget-weighted CES welfare", i.e., i∈N Biu ρ i 1/ρ , where Bi is agent i's budget. We discuss this in Section 6.1. The price curves will take the exact same form.
and further developed by [5] , although not under the same name. See [18] for a modern discussion of welfare functions. We briefly mention an important property in mechanism design: strategy-proofness. A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never improve their utility by lying about their preferences. Unfortunately, even in simple settings, the only mechanism for resource allocation that can simultaneously guarantee strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is dictatorial, meaning that one agent receives all of the resources [26] . This is clearly unacceptable, so we sacrifice strategy-proofness in favor of Pareto optimality. Specifically, we assume throughout the paper that agents always truthfully report their preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 formally defines the model. Section 4 presents our first main result: that for strictly increasing price curves, an allocation can be supported if and only if it is group-domination-free. In Section 5, we use this characterization to show that allocations with optimal max-min welfare can be supported by price curves in a wide range of settings. Section 6 gives our second main result: that in the bandwidth allocation setting, every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. At this point we conclude the main paper, and move on to supplementary results. In Appendix A, we generalize our characterization theorem from Section 4 to account for weakly increasing price curves. We use this theorem to prove several more results about CES welfare in Appendix B. Appendix C provides counterexamples to various claims that one might have hoped to prove. We also discuss in that section why certain other classes of utilities -in particular, linear utilities -are much more difficult to analyze. Finally, Appendix D provides some proofs that are omitted from earlier sections.
Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, and let M be a set of divisible goods, where |M | = m. Throughout the paper, we use i and k to refer to agents and j and ℓ to refer to goods. The social planner needs to determine an allocation x ∈ [0, 1] n×m , where x i ∈ [0, 1] m is the bundle of agent i, and x ij ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of good j allocated to agent i. An allocation cannot allocate more than the available supply: x is a valid allocation if and only if i x ij ≤ 1 for all j. 7 Agent i's utility for a bundle x i is denoted by u i (x i ) ∈ R ≥0 . The literature studies many subclasses of utility functions. For example, Leontief utilities have the form
where w ij represents the weight agent i has for good j. For brevity, we will usually write u i (x i ) = min j∈M x ij w ij and leave the w ij = 0 condition implicit. The same holds for other contexts where we are dividing by a value w ij that may be zero. We assume that agents have Leontief utilities throughout the paper, and we assume that each agent has nonzero weight for at least one good.
Just as agents have utilities over the bundles they receive, we can imagine a social planner who wishes to design a pricing mechanism to maximize some societal welfare function Φ(x). One can think of Φ as the social planner's utility function, which takes as input the agent utilities, instead of a bundle of goods. The most well-studied welfare functions are the max-min welfare Φ(x) = min i∈N u i (x i ), the Nash welfare Φ(x) = i∈N u i 1/n , and the utilitarian welfare Φ(x) =
7 Unless otherwise stated, we assume without loss of generality that the supply of each good is normalized to 1. i∈N u i (x i ). 8 These three welfare functions can be generalized by a CES welfare function:
where ρ is a constant in (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1].
Fisher markets
The simplest market model is a Fisher market [6] . In a Fisher market, each good is available for sale and each agent enters the market with a fixed budget she wishes to spend. It is assumed that agents have no value for leftover money; this will imply that each agent always spends her entire budget. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that all agents have the same budget, and normalize all budgets to 1 without loss of generality. Informally, a Fisher market equilibrium assigns a price p j ∈ R ≥0 to each good j so that the agents' demand equals supply. Formally, for a price vector p ∈ R m ≥0 , the cost of bundle
s demand set is the set of her favorite affordable bundles, i.e.,
arg max
If p j > 0 for all j ∈ M , an agent with Leontief utility will always purchase in exact proportion to her weights: since agent i's utility is determined by min j∈M x ij w ij , violating these proportions cannot increase her utility. Thus when discussing an arbitrary allocation x, we assume that each bundle x i is in proportion to agent i's weights: otherwise there is no hope of supporting such an allocation. For brevity, we leave this assumption implicit through the paper, rather than always stating "for an arbitrary allocation x where each bundle is in proportion to agent i's weights".
The careful reader may note that we are glossing over a detail: if p j = 0 for some good j, agent i can add more of good j to her bundle at no additional cost. This does not affect agent utilities at all, but is technically possible. In order to avoid handling this uninteresting and sometimes messy edge case, we assume throughout the paper that for agents with Leontief utilities, demand sets and arbitrary allocations are always in exact proportion to agent weights.
Formally, a Fisher market equilibrium (x, p) is an allocation x and price vector p ∈ R m ≥0 such that 1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set:
2. The market clears: for all j ∈ M , i∈N x ij ≤ 1. Also, if p j > 0, then i∈N x ij = 1.
When all agents have the same budget, this is also called the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes [30] .
For a wide class of agent utilities, including Leontief utilities, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [1] 9 . Furthermore, the equilibrium allocations are the exactly the allocations which maximize Nash welfare 10 . This is made explicit by the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale convex program [10, 11] , and combinatorial approaches to computing market equilibria [9, 15] . 8 One could also imagine the (arguably less natural) case of a social planner who cares about some agents' utilities more than others, which would manifest as weights in her utility function. We briefly consider this case in the setting of CES welfare with unequal budgets (Section 6.1). 9 Specifically, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as long agent utilities are continuous, quasi-concave, and nonsatiated. The full Arrow-Debreu model also allows for agents to enter to market with goods themselves and not only money; the necessary conditions on utilities are slightly more complex in that setting. 10 The conditions for the correspondence between Fisher market equilibria and Nash welfare are slightly stricter
Price curves
Our paper considers an expanded model where instead of assigning a single price p j ∈ R ≥0 to each good, we assign each good a price curve f j : R ≥0 → R ≥0 . The function f j expresses the cost of good j as a function of the quantity purchased. When we say "price curve", we mean a function f j that is weakly increasing (buying more of a good cannot cost less), normalized (f j (0) = 0), and continuous. Setting f j (x) = p j · x for all j ∈ M and all x ∈ R ≥0 yields the Fisher market setting. Given a vector of price curves f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ), the cost of a bundle x i is now C f (x i ) = j∈M f j (x ij ). Although the functions f j may not be linear, the cost of a bundle is still additive across goods. Each agent's demand set is defined identically to the Fisher market setting:
The demand set is intuitively the same as in the Fisher market setting: each agent purchases exactly in proportion to her weights, and buys as much as she can without exceeding her budget. A price curve equilibrium (x, f ) as an allocation x and vector of price curves f such that 1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set:
2. The demand does not exceed supply: i∈N x ij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M 11 .
We say that price curves f support an allocation x if (x, f ) is a price curve equilibrium. The fundamental question we address in this paper is: what allocations x can be supported?
Group domination
Recall that we require price curves to be continuous and weakly increasing. We wish to theoretically characterize which allocations can be supported by price curves so that we can (1) apply this characterization in our subsequent proofs, and (2) construct an algorithm which can calculate price curves in polynomial time.
The true necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation to be supported by price curves -and an algorithm to compute them -is given in Appendix A. However, this condition ("lockedagent-freeness") is somewhat unwieldy. Although weakly increasing price curves are sometimes necessary 12 , for now we will consider only strictly increasing price curves. The corresponding necessary and sufficient condition is the cleaner notion of group-domination-freeness.
We have termed the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of strictly increasing price curves "group-domination-freeness" (GDF). To gain intuition for this condition, consider an allothan those for market equilibrium existence, but are still quite general. Sufficient criteria were given in [10] and generalized slightly by [15] .
11 For Fisher market equilibria, the second condition also stipulated that whenever pj > 0, j∈M xij = 1. Without this additional condition, cranking up all prices to infinity would result in trivial equilibria where all agents purchase almost nothing and so would certainly not maximize Nash welfare. Such trivial price curve equilibria do exist under our definition, but since we are not going to make any claims of the form "all price curve equilibria maximize a certain function", there is no issue with allowing these trivial equilibria to exist.
12 Consider an instance with two goods and two agents, whose weights are given by w11 = w21 = w12 = 1 and w22 = 0. Nash welfare is maximized by splitting good 1 evenly between the two agents, and allowing agent 1 to purchase an equal quantity of good 2. This only possible if the price of good 2 is zero: otherwise, agent 1 is paying more than agent 2. Recall that the Fisher market equilibrium prices are the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare: thus the price of good 2 being zero corresponds to the fact that the supply constraint for good 2 is not tight in this instance. cation x and agents i, k. We will say that agent i dominates agent k if ∀j x ij ≥ x kj and there exists j for which this inequality is strict. Observe that this would prevent the existence of strictly increasing price curves supporting allocation x -both agents must spend their full budget (otherwise they could buy more of every good, since price curves are continuous), but agent i buys strictly more than agent k. A similar scenario arises when considering two weighted groups of agents a, b with the same total weight. If for every possible quantity τ ∈ R ≥0 of any good j, considering only agents purchasing at least τ of good j, the weight of the agents in a is greater than or equal to the weight of agents in b, then b can never be made to pay more than a. Essentially, for each additional δ of any good, as many agents from a must purchase that δ as agents from b, so no matter how we price these increments, b never pays more. If this difference in weights is strict for any (j, τ ) pair, that implies some δ increment must cost 0 (so that the total expenditure of a and b is equal), violating the requirement that price curves be strictly increasing.
Another way to gain intuition for group domination is by analogy to stochastic dominance. Distribution a stochastically dominates distribution b if for every possible payoff τ ∈ R ≥0 , the odds of getting at least τ from a are at least as high as the odds of getting at least τ from b.
One consequence of stochastic dominance is that any rational agent should prefer a to b -there are no trade-offs, a is simply better than (dominant over) b. In fact, we can directly consider weighted groups of agents as probability distributions. The total weight of each group must be the same -without loss of generality, equal to 1. Consider sampling the allocations x ij for any good j with probability equal to the weight of each agent. The probability distribution a stochastically dominating b is exactly equivalent to the weighted group a group-dominating b. Thus not only does group domination create problems for pricing, it can arguably be considered unfair, as a is in some sense objectively better-off than b 13 .
The formal definition of this condition is below.
Definition 4.1 (Group-domination-free (GDF)). Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) be vectors in R n ≥0 that assign a (possibly zero) weight to each agent, such that i∈N a i = i∈N b i . Then a group-dominates b in an allocation x (denoted a ≻ b) if for all j ∈ M and for any threshold τ ∈ R ≥0 , i∈N :
and there exists a (j, τ ) pair where the inequality is strict. x is group-domination-free if there do not exist vectors a, b ∈ R n ≥0 such that a ≻ b in x. 14 We will also assume without loss of generality that for all i ∈ N , at most one of a i and b i is nonzero: were this not the case, we could define a ′ and
, and we would have a ′ ≻ b ′ as well. Theorem 4.3 will show that an allocation can be supported with strictly increasing price curves if and only if it is GDF.
Characterization of allocations supported by strictly increasing price curves
In order to relate the existence of price curves to GDF, first observe that, for agents with Leontief utilities, the conditions for a price curve equilibrium take on a relatively simple form. Recall that 13 See [12] for an introduction to stochastic dominance. 14 The "-free/-freeness" suffix may remind some readers of the popular fairness notion envy-freeness; this connection is intended. If one agent does envy another, this constitutes an instance of group domination in the allocation, so GDF implies envy-freeness. However, the reverse is not true: for an agent i to envy agent k, k must receive strictly more of every good i cares about; for group domination, the difference need only be strict on one good.
by assumption, the allocation to be considered doesn't violate supply, and each agent purchases goods in exact proportion to her weights (see Section 3.1). Then the condition that x i ∈ D i (f ) for all i can be captured by Lemma 4.1, whose proof appears in Appendix D. Intuitively, agent i fills up her bundle in proportion to her weights until (1) she reaches her budget and (2) there exists a good where buying more would cost more.
Lemma 4.1. Given price curves f , x i ∈ D i (f ) if and only if both of the following hold: (1) C f (x i ) = 1, and (2) there exists j ∈ M such that for all ε > 0,
Given these requirements, we now rely on three key observations to relate price curves to GDF: (1) Only the points on the price curves corresponding to agent allocations matter. (2) Only the order of the agents, not their absolute allocations, matters. (3) The order of the agents can be captured in an agent-order matrix such that the column sums and row sums represent agent costs and group dominations, respectively.
We will illustrate these observations with the example allocation shown in Figure 1a . First we deal with observation 4.2. Consider the possible price curves shown in Figure 1c . Given the price that each agent pays for each good, these are the only points that matter, in the sense that (a) each agent's total cost, which must equal 1, depends only on these points, and (b) an agent must be able to purchase more of a good if the next fixed point on that curve has the same price, and otherwise need not be able to do so. Thus when considering whether price curves are possible, we need only consider the set of prices corresponding to agent allocations.
A similar argument addresses observation 4.2. As long as we fix the order of points along a price curve, we can change the allocations arbitrarily (assuming they still obey the supply and proportional-purchase assumptions) without changing the prices. Obviously, every agent will still incur a cost of 1, and it will not change whether an agent can purchase more of a good (whether the next point along the curve has the same price).
Finally, we come to the more complicated observation 4.2. We will first lay out how the agentorder matrix is constructed, then illustrate its connection to both prices and group domination. The matrix will have n rows, one for each agent, and a sub-block for each good, as shown in Figure 1b . Within a sub-block, each column will correspond to a non-zero agent allocation (i.e., the non-zero points shown in Figure 1c ). The entry corresponding to agent i, good j, and allocation threshold τ ∈ R ≥0 will equal 1 if x ij ≥ τ and 0 otherwise. Essentially, this will indicate which agent pays the cost of the first, second, etc. section of each price curve. Additionally, we append a column of −1's to the end of the matrix. To see the connection to prices, consider a vector y such that Ay = 0, y = 0. For instance, Figure 2a exhibits such a vector y for the matrix A shown in Figure 1b . y will represent prices, so we require all the entries to be non-negative, denoted y ≥ 0; for strictly increasing price curves, we require y to be strongly positive 15 , denoted y ≫ 0. Specifically, within each block (corresponding to a good j), the first entry represents the cost of increasing from 0 of good j to the first non-zero point on the price curve, the second entry represents the cost of increasing from the first point to the second point, and so on. The last entry in y, which we can assume equals 1 without loss of generality, represents the total cost expended by each agent. Thus Ay = 0 ensures that each agent spends exactly 1 unit of money. (Ensuring that condition 4.1 of Lemma 4.1 be met is slightly more complicated. However, for strictly increasing price curves, it is trivially satisfied.)
Thus we can see that column sums of the agent-order matrix correspond to agent expenditures. Row sums, however, correspond to group domination. To see the connection, consider a vector z such that A T z is strictly positive 16 , denoted A T z > 0. For instance, Figure 2b exhibits such 15 Recall that a strongly positive vector has every entry greater than 0. 16 Recall that a strictly positive vector has entries in R ≥0 with at least one entry non-zero. a vector z for the matrix A shown in Figure 1b . Given z, the positive entries correspond to the weights of agents in a dominating group a, while the (absolute value of the) negative entries are the weights of agents in group b. Since the last entry of A T z must be nonnegative, the total weight of b is at least as large as that of a. And since A T z > 0, all the entries are non-negative and at least one other entry must be positive. This means that at every point on a price curve (any j, τ ), the weight of group a purchasing at least τ of good j is at least as much as the weight of group b purchasing τ , and for some (j, τ ) this is strict. Clearly this is equivalent to a ≻ b.
Having constructed the agent-order matrix and related its column and row sums to prices and group domination, respectively, the final step applies a previously-known duality result equivalent to Farkas's Lemma [22] , which establishes that valid prices (column sums) exist if and only if group domination (row sums) do not. Specifically, we make use of the following result originally due to Stiemke to prove Theorem 4.3.
Lemma 4.2 (1.6.4 in [29] ). For a commutative, ordered field F, A a matrix over F, the following are equivalent.
1. Ay = 0, y ≫ 0 has no solution 2. A T z > 0 has a solution Theorem 4.3. Let x be any allocation that obeys the supply constraints and gives at least one agent a nonempty bundle. Then x be can supported by strictly increasing price curves if and only if x is GDF.
Proof. Recall that an allocation x can be supported if there exist price curves f such that x i ∈ D i (f ) ∀i ∈ N , and i∈N x ij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ M (i.e., x obeys the supply constraints). The latter condition is satisfied by assumption, and by Lemma 4.1, for Leontief utilities and strictly increasing price curves, the former condition holds if and only if the cost C f (x i ) = 1 ∀i.
Let X j = {x ij | i ∈ N } \ {0} be the set of distinct, non-zero amounts of good j allocated to some agent under x. Label the elements of X j as τ 1 j , τ 2 j , . . . , τ
∈ X j ) in some sense doesn't matter -we only require that these "in-between" areas of the price curve don't violate continuity and are strictly increasing. Thus there exist strictly increasing price curves f supporting x if and only if there exist functions f ′ j :
∀i. Now we are ready to set up the agent-order matrix A ∈ Q n×( j |X j |+1) to which we will apply Lemma 4.2. Since each column will represent an allocation point for a specific good (corresponding to its sub-block), we will write the column indices as ℓ<j |X ℓ | + q, where j indicates the sub-block and 1 ≤ q ≤ |X j | is the index within that sub-block.
Thus each row of A represents an agent, and each column (except the last) represents one point of the functions f ′ . Since x gives at least one agent a nonempty bundle by assumption, A has at least two columns (one allocation point and the column of −1's). We know by Lemma 4.2 that ∃y ≫ 0 such that Ay = 0 if and only if ∃z such that A T z > 0. To complete the proof, we will show that the former condition is equivalent to the existence of strictly increasing price curves supporting x, and the latter is equivalent to a group domination.
If ∃y ≫ 0 such that Ay = 0, we may assume without loss of generality that the last entry in y is
Thus Ay = 0 is equivalent to the requirement that C f (x i ) = 1 ∀i. Finally, consider z such that A T z > 0. This is equivalent to a group domination a ≻ b, where
, and all other entries are 0. Consider the product of the last column of A with z, which equals − i z i ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we can assume i z i = 0, and thus i a i = i b i . If this is not true, then b would have greater weight than a, and decreasing any weight in b can only increase coordinates of A T z or equivalently widen the gap between a and b in terms of group domination. Now observe that for any good j and τ ∈ R ≥0 , i∈N :x ij ≥τ (a i − b i ) is equal to the dot product of column ℓ<j |X ℓ | + q of A by z, where q is the largest value such that τ q j ≤ τ . This holds because A i, ℓ<j |X ℓ | + q is an indicator variable for x ij ≥ τ . Therefore A T z > 0 is equivalent to the requirement that i∈N :x ij ≥τ (a i − b i ) ≥ 0 for all (j, τ ) and that for some (j, τ ) this inequality is strict, i.e., A T z > 0 is equivalent to a ≻ b.
Remark. Since the matrix A constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.3 is over the rationals, we can also assume that the y or z obtained via Lemma 4.2 are over the rationals. In particular, we can scale z to obtain z ′ ∈ Z n with A T z ′ > 0. Equivalently, this means that if a ≻ b, we can assume without loss of generality that a i , b i ∈ Z.
This characterization, in addition to allowing us to prove some of our subsequent results, implies that we can compute price curves (or show that they do not exist) for a particular instance in polynomial time. This is exhibited by the following linear program. Proof. As per the proof of Theorem 4.3, there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x if and only if there is a solution to the system Ay = 0, y ≫ 0. To turn this into a valid linear program, instead of the strict inequality y k > 0 for each coordinate of y, we write y k ≥ η and attempt to maximize η. Furthermore, we restrict the final entry of y as y −1 = 1, since otherwise y can be scaled arbitrarily. If there is a solution with η > 0, then y corresponds to price curves as before, with each entry representing the difference in price between adjacent allocation amounts. These points simply need to be connected, e.g., in a piecewise linear fashion, to constitute valid price curves.
One may wonder if Theorem 4.3 generalizes to other classes of utility functions. Unfortunately, the answer in general is no. Example 3 gives an instance with linear utilities that is GDF, but cannot be supported by price curves.
In Section 5, we will show how the group-domination-freeness concept can be useful for proving that allocations of interest can be supported by price curves: specifically, allocations with optimal (or near optimal) max-min welfare. But first, a word about unequal budgets.
Unequal budgets
It turns out that the characterization theorem of the previous section easily generalizes to agents with unequal budgets. Since price curves are strictly increasing, the only additional requirement for an allocation x to be supported is that each agent spends her entire budget B i . In the agent-order matrix, the last column of −1's corresponded to each agent's expenditure, so we simply need to replace −1 with −B i for each row i.
Following Lemma 4.2 with the modified agent-order matrix, the if-and-only-if characterization becomes "budget-weighted group-domination-freeness". A budget-weighted group domination still requires that for all (j, τ ),
and that there exists j, τ where the inequality is strict. The only difference is that instead of requiring both groups to have the same total weight, that weight is now scaled by each agent's budget. That is, i∈N a i B i = i∈N b i B i . Note that when B i = 1 for all i, this recovers the definition of group domination.
Warm-up: max-min welfare
In this section, we show that under mild assumptions, price curves can support allocations with either optimal max-min welfare, or arbitrarily close to optimal max-min welfare. As before, we assume that agents have Leontief utility functions. Also, we refer to an allocation with optimal max-min welfare as a max-min allocation. The proof of this turns out to be quite simple, so we think of this section as a warm-up.
The first thing we observe is that when agent weights are unconstrained in magnitude, there is no hope to support any approximation of max-min welfare. Consider a single good and two agents with weights w 11 and w 21 on that good. In this case, each agent i's utility is just x i1 /w i1 , so the max-min welfare of an allocation x is min(
). Now imagine that w 11 is much larger than w 21 : agent 1 needs significantly more of the good to achieve the same utility as agent 2. Then any max-min allocation (or even any decent approximation) must give more of the good to agent 1 than agent 2. But since agents have the same budgets, any price curve equilibrium must result in each agent receiving half of the supply of good 1, which is a contradiction.
Thus in order to have any hope of even approximately supporting a max-min allocation, the agent weights must be normalized in some way. Theorem 5.1 states that under a mild normalization assumption, we can support a max-min allocation.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose there exist strictly increasing functions g 1 , . . . , g m such that for all i ∈ N , j∈M g j (w ij ) = 1. Then there exists a max-min allocation that can be supported by price curves.
Proof. Since the max-min welfare of an allocation is determined by the minimum agent utility, the max-min welfare cannot be improved by making any agent's utility higher than any other. Similarly, since each agent's utility is determined by min j∈M x ij /w ij , the max-min welfare cannot be improved by allocating goods to an agent outside of her desired proportions. Thus there exists a max-min allocation x where all agents have the same utility u, and where x ij = u · w ij for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M .
Since GDF is invariant to scaling by constants, this implies that x is GDF if and only if the weight vectors themselves are GDF. That is, x is GDF if and only if the allocation x ′ defined by x ′ ij = w ij is GDF. One realizes that the assumption of j∈M g j (w ij ) = 1 for all i ∈ N is literally assuming that there exist (strictly increasing) price curves that support the allocation x ′ . Thus x ′ is GDF by Theorem 4.3, so x is GDF, which completes the proof.
One natural corollary of Theorem 5.1 is the following:
Corollary 5.1.1. Suppose there exists some q ≥ 1 so that j∈M w q ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then there exists a max-min allocation that can be supported by price curves.
Theorem 5.1 has an interesting conceptual implication. We can think of price curves themselves as a sort of "norm" on the allocation, and any allocation for which there is a "norm" which assigns the same value to each agent's bundle is reasonable enough that it can be supported by price curves. The previous statement can be rephrased as "an allocation can be supported by price curves if and only if there exist price curves which assign the same cost to each agent's bundle", and so is functionally a tautology. Since there exists a max-min allocation which is a constant scaling of the agent weights, this near-tautology carries over.
One final observation is that there are some interesting norms, such as the L ∞ norm, which cannot be written as the sum of increasing functions. In fact, there are cases where no max-min allocation can be supported when agent weights have the same L ∞ norm. 17 Furthermore, the following counterexample falls under the even simpler bandwidth allocation setting: w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j.
Theorem 5.2. There exist instances where w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , but no max-min allocation can be supported.
Proof. Consider an instance with three agents and two goods, where the agent weights are given by the following table:
agent
The unique max-min allocation is x 11 = x 22 = x 31 = x 32 = 1 2 . Thus any price curves
, which is a contradiction. Thus no max-min allocation can be supported.
The good news is that the L ∞ norm can be approximated to arbitrary precision by L q norms, leading to the following theorem. We use Φ M M (x) = min i∈N u i (x i ) to denote the max-min welfare of allocation x. Theorem 5.3. Suppose that max j∈M w ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists an allocation x that can be supported by price curves where
With this warm-up in hand, we now move on to our second main result, which concerns CES welfare functions.
CES welfare
In this section, we consider CES welfare functions:
This section contains our second main result: that in the bandwidth setting (i.e., agents have Leontief utilities where w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , j ∈ M ), for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. Our proof uses the dual of the convex program for maximizing CES welfare to construct explicit price curves that support a maximum CES welfare allocation. The price curves take the very simple form of f j (x) = q j x 1−ρ for constants q 1 , . . . , q m that are derived from the dual.
Theorem 6.1. If w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , then for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We begin by writing the following program to maximize CES welfare:
is concave for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), so the resulting program is convex. For brevity, we will omit "where w ij = 0" for the rest of the proof, and assume that any terms which could cause division by zero are simply omitted.
We can remove the exponent of 1/ρ from the objective without affecting the optimal point: the optimal value may be affected, but the optimal solution (i.e., the arg max) will not. When ρ is negative, this changes the program to a minimization program, but this can be handled by adding a factor of 1/ρ to the objective. 18 Thus the new program is
We add a factor of 1/ρ instead of ρ because this will slightly simplify the analysis.
Next, we write the Lagrangian of this program. Let λ ij be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint u i ≤ x ij w ij and let q j be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint i∈N x ij ≤ 1. We will use λ and q to denote the vectors of all such Lagrange multipliers. Then the Lagrangian is given by
Consider any maximum CES welfare allocation: this corresponds to a point (x * , u * ) which is optimal for the primal. We have strong duality by Slater's condition, so there must exist λ * and q * such that (x * , u * , λ * , q * ) is optimal for L. Since the primal objective was concave, L is concave in x and u, so the gradient of L evaluated at (x * , u * , λ * , q * ) must be zero. In particular,
for every i ∈ N and j ∈ M , and so λ * ij = q * j w ij . This implies that u * i = j∈M q * j w ij We now use the Lagrange multipliers q * to construct explicit price curves. We define f j (x) by f j (x) = q * j x 1−ρ . Since ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), we have 1 − ρ > 0, so these price curves are in fact increasing.
We claim that (x * , f ) is a price curve equilibrium. To see this, we explicit compute the cost of agent i's bundle x * i :
The crucial use of w iℓ ∈ {0, 1} is that w
Thus x * i is affordable to agent i. Furthermore, since these price curves are strictly increasing, no bundle with higher utility is affordable to agent i, so x * i is in agent i's demand set. We also know that j∈M x * ij ≤ 1, since x * is a feasible solution to the primal. Therefore (x * , f ) is a price curve equilibrium.
The structure of the price curve themselves (f j (x) = q * j x 1−ρ ) is also interesting when we consider the interpretation of the parameter ρ: the smaller ρ is, the more we care about agents with small utility. Recall that taking of ρ → −∞ yields max-min welfare, where we only care about the minimum utility. When ρ = 1, we have utilitarian welfare, where we only care about overall efficiency. This roughly corresponds to caring more about agents with higher utility. The limit as ρ → 0 corresponds to Nash welfare, which is a mix of caring about both agents with low utility and those with high utility.
We know that maximum Nash welfare allocations are supported by linear price curves, i.e., those with constant marginal prices. When ρ < 0, these marginal prices are increasing, making it easier for agents who are buying less of each good. Since w ij ∈ {0, 1}, u i (x i ) = x ij whenever w ij = 0, so the agents who are buying less are also the ones with lower utility. Thus price curves of this form for ρ < 0 are benefiting the agents with low utility. Furthermore, the smaller ρ is, the faster marginal prices grow, which corresponds to favoring agents with low utility even more. On the other hand, when ρ > 0, these marginal prices are decreasing. This favors agents with higher utility, which is consistent with the interpretation of the CES welfare function with ρ > 0.
Unequal budgets
Finally, we address the setting where agents may have different amounts of money to spend. Let B i be agent i's budget. If we instead consider the budget-weighted CES welfare
then the above argument extends directly. Duality tells us that agent i's utility must be
and by using the same price curves of f j (x) = q * j x 1−ρ , we get
so agent i is indeed spending exactly her budget. A social planner may prefer to give the same weight to each agent's utility, even if the budgets are not the same. Unfortunately, allocations with optimal unweighted CES welfare cannot be supported (at least not exactly) when agents have different budgets. To see this, consider two agents with different budgets and a single good: whichever agent has more money must receive a larger portion of the good. But assuming the agents have the same weight for that good (which holds in the bandwidth allocation setting or when weights are normalized somehow), the unweighted CES welfare optimum would give each agent the same amount. This is analogous to the Fisher market setting: the Fisher market equilibria for unequal budgets are exactly the allocations which maximize the budget-weighted Nash welfare.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed price curves in several different settings, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. Our first main result was that for strictly increasing price curves, an allocation can be supported if and only if it is GDF. We proved this by defining the agent-order matrix, and using duality theorems to show the existence of a strongly positive solution to a particular system of linear equations. Our second main result was that in the bandwidth allocation setting, the maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. These price curves took the simple form of f j (x) = q j x 1−ρ . This is contrast to the standard linear pricing setting, where only maximum Nash welfare allocations can be equilibria.
There are many possible directions for future research. The first is the possibility of tâtonnement for price curves. A tâtonnement process iteratively computes an equilibrium allocation by asking agents for their demand given a set of prices, and then updates prices accordingly (typically by raising the price of goods whose demand exceeds supply and lowering the price of goods whose demand is less than the supply). These processes have been well-studied for linear prices. One approach makes use of the fact that the equilibrium prices are the dual variables in the convex program to maximize Nash welfare, and gives a tâtonnement process that is akin to gradient descent on the dual program. We think that this approach could also yield tâtonnement for price curves, in particular for maximum CES welfare allocations in bandwidth allocation. This is because q 1 , . . . , q m are exactly the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing CES welfare, just as linear prices are the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare. We think this deserves further study.
A second possible direction is studying price curves for other classes of agent utilities, and in particular, linear utilities. We will discuss in Appendix C some of the challenges that linear utilities pose for analyzing price curves, but perhaps everything would fall into place with the right framework.
Third, future research could consider in more depth the setting of price curves with unequal budgets. Our results did extend to this setting in the sense of budget-weighted group-domination and budget-weighted CES welfare, but weighting agents' utilities by the amount of money they have seems inappropriate for many contexts.
Last but not least, we are intrigued by the connection between GDF and the agent-order matrix and duality theorems, and we wonder if this connection could be useful for other resource allocation problems as well.
A Characterization of allocations supported by weakly increasing price curves
In Section 4, we showed that an allocation can be supported with strictly increasing price curves if and only it is GDF. In this section, we provide the analogous necessary and sufficient condition for the case where any (continuous, weakly increasing) price curves are permitted. This boils down to what we called locked-agent-freeness (LAF). LAF is not a particularly interesting condition on its own -though as with GDF it implies a polynomial time algorithm for finding price curves -but it is crucial in allowing us to prove that maximum CES welfare allocations can be supported.
For an allocation x, we wish to determine whether there exist price curves f such that (x, f ) is a price curve equilibrium. Assuming x obeys the supply constraints, we just need to determine whether there exist price curves f such that
Recall that a ≻ b if for all j ∈ M and τ ∈ R ≥0 , i∈N :x ij ≥τ (a i − b i ) ≥ 0, and there exists a (j, τ ) pair such that the inequality is strict. As discussed in Section 4, this implies that the aggregate spending of a is at least that of b for any f , i.e., i∈N
for any price curves f . Furthermore, we argued that for strictly increasing f , the inequality is strict, so b cannot be made to pay as much as a. When we allow weakly increasing price curves, a ≻ b simply implies that, for any marginal price where a would have to pay strictly more than b, that marginal price must be zero.
We still need to ensure that x i ∈ D i (f ) ∀i ∈ N , i.e., that every agent spends her full budget and cannot get more utility for free (Lemma 4.1). This requirement can be expressed by locked-agentfreeness.
Definition A.1 (Locked-agent-free (LAF)). For simplicity, we define two meanings of "locked":
• Agent i is locked in an allocation x if there exists a domination a ≻ b such that for all j ∈ M where x ij > 0, and all sufficiently small ε > 0, a ≻ b is strict at (j, x ij + ε).
• The allocation is locked if there exists a ≻ b which is strict at every (j, τ ) for τ ∈ (0, max i x ij ].
If nothing is locked in allocation x, we say that x is locked-agent-free (LAF).
Intuitively, an agent being locked implies that the cost to increase her allocation must be zero, which will violate condition 4.1 of Lemma 4.1. The allocation being locked implies that all marginal prices must be zero, and thus all price curves must be identically zero. Clearly, any non-LAF allocation cannot be supported by price curves. Perhaps surprisingly, the opposite directly holds as well, as stated by Theorem A.2.
The proof of Theorem A.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3 for strictly increasing price curves. The main difference is that strictly increasing price curves trivially satisfy condition 4.1 of Lemma 4.1, preventing any agent from getting more utility for free. For weakly increasing price curves, however, we need to add a constraint specifically to ensure that condition is satisfied. Thus in addition to the agent-order matrix, we will define a marginal-cost matrix to ensure that no agent has a marginal cost of zero to increase her utility. In order to incorporate this matrix, we use a more general duality result than Lemma 4.2 (although still equivalent to Farkas's Lemma [22] ), this one due to Motzkin. Recall that v > 0 denotes a strictly positive vector, and v ≫ 0 strongly positive.
Lemma A.1 (1.6.1 in [29] ). For matrices A, B, C over R, the following are equivalent. Proof. Recall that an allocation x is supported by price curves f if x i ∈ D i (f ) ∀i ∈ N , and i∈N x ij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ M . The latter condition is satisfied by assumption, and by Lemma 4.1, for Leontief utilities, the former condition holds if and only if the cost C f (x i ) = 1 and there exists j ∈ M such that ∀ε > 0 f j (x ij + εw ij ) > f j (x ij ).
As before, let X j = {x ij | i ∈ N } \ {0} be the set of distinct, non-zero amounts of good j allocated to some agent under x. Label these elements such that τ 1 j < τ 2 j < · · · < τ
∈ X j ) in some sense doesn't matter -we only require that these "in-between" areas of the price curve are weakly increasing and don't violate continuity. Thus there exist price curves f supporting x if and only if there exist functions f ′ j : X j → R ≥0 such that 
Now we are ready to set up the matrices A, B, C (all of width j |X j | + 1) to which we will apply Lemma A.1. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, A will be the agent-order matrix, and the solution vector y will represent the marginal prices, with the last entry representing the total cost per agent. Thus, define
Furthermore, let B be the square identity matrix I; this will ensure that the prices are weakly increasing. Finally, we need to define the marginal-cost matrix C. As shown in Figure 3 , we can create C based only on A: If agent i receives the largest amount of some good (row i has a 1 in the last column of some sub-block), then agent i's row in C is all 1's. Intuitively, we can set the price above max i x ij arbitrarily to ensure i has positive marginal cost, so it should be trivial to satisfy C i y > 0. Otherwise, agent i's row is all zeros, except that within a sub-block if there is a 1 followed by a 0 in row i in A, the position of that 0 becomes a 1 in C. Intuitively, these are the places i would have to buy more of a good to increase her utility. Formally, define
Since x gives at least one agent a nonempty bundle by assumption, A, B, C have at least two columns. We know by Lemma A.1 that ∃y such that Ay = 0, By ≥ 0, Cy ≫ 0 if and only if ∃u, v, w such that
To complete the proof, we will show that the former condition is equivalent to the existence of weakly increasing price curves supporting x, and the latter is equivalent to either x or an agent i being locked.
Define
, where for convenience we let f ′ j (τ 0 j ) = f ′ j (0) = 0. Clearly By = y ≥ 0 is equivalent to the requirement that price curves be weakly increasing. Furthermore, note that Cy ≫ 0 implies y > 0, so without loss of generality we can assume the last entry of y is 1. Thus as before, Ay = 0 is equivalent to the requirement that every agent's total cost equals 1. Revisiting Cy ≫ 0, since y > 0 this is trivially satisfied for every row where agent i receives the largest amount of some good -equivalently, agent i's marginal cost can trivially be made positive. Additionally, for all other agents, C i y > 0 is by definition equivalent to having positive marginal cost. Thus a solution vector y is equivalent to weakly increasing price curves supporting x.
If no such solution exists, then we have A T u + B T v + C T w = 0, v ≥ 0, w > 0. Rearranging, and since B = I, this is equivalent to A T u ≥ C T w, w > 0. Without loss of generality, assume w is only non-zero on entry i. Furthermore, for all k define a k = u k if u k > 0 and b k = −u k if u k < 0. Then A T u ≥ C T w is equivalent to a ≻ b such that the domination is strict wherever C i is non-zero. If C i = 1, this is equivalent to allocation x being locked. Otherwise, this is equivalent to agent i being locked. Thus A T u ≥ C T w, w > 0 is equivalent to something being locked in x.
Finally, we observe that LAF give us the following linear program, which computes price curves (or shows that none exist) in polynomial time.
Theorem A.3. Given a set of agents N , goods M , and an allocation x ∈ [0, 1] n×m , let A be the corresponding agent-order matrix and C the marginal-cost matrix. In the following linear program, the optimal objective value is strictly positive if and only if there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x, in which case y defines such curves.
Proof. As per the proof of Theorem A.2, there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x if and only if there is a solution to the system Ay = 0, y ≥ 0, Cy ≫ 0. To turn this into a valid linear program, we replace the strict inequality C i y > 0 with C i y ≥ η and attempt to maximize η. Furthermore, we restrict the final entry of y as y −1 = 1, since otherwise y can be scaled arbitrarily. If there is a solution with η > 0, then y corresponds to price curves as before, with each entry representing the difference in price between adjacent allocation amounts. These points simply need to be connected, e.g., in a piecewise linear fashion, to constitute valid price curves.
B Other results for CES welfare
In Section 6, we showed that in the bandwidth setting, the maximum CES welfare allocations can be supported by price curves (Theorem 6.1). We proved this by using duality to construct explicit price curves of the form f j (x) = q j x 1−ρ .
This section presents additional results for CES welfare. In Section B.1, we give an alternative proof of Theorem 6.1 which uses the group domination approach from Section 4 and Appendix A. Section B.2 considers two other settings where the maximum CES welfare allocations be can supported for any ρ < 0: (1) when there are two agents and the agents' weights obey any reasonable norm, and (2) for any number of agents, when the agents' weights are normalized with respect to ρ.
B.1 An alternative proof for the bandwidth case using group domination
This section presents an alternative proof of Theorem 6.1 using the group domination notions. It turns out that there exist instances where the maximum CES welfare allocations cannot be supported by strictly increasing price curves, but can be supported by weakly increasing price curves (Example 2). Thus the GDF characterization theorem from Section 4 will not be sufficient, and we will have to use the slightly more unwieldy LAF characterization theorem from Appendix A.
The proof considers an arbitrary, locked or locked-agent allocation x, and constructs special vectors a, b that satisfy a stronger version of a ≻ b. We show that by taking a fraction of a's allocation and giving it to b, we can construct a new allocation with strictly higher CES welfare. This shows that any maximum CES allocation must be LAF, and hence can be supported by price curves by Theorem A.2. However, constructing this new allocation and proving that it has better CES welfare is quite technically involved, with a surprise cameo from L'Hôpital's rule.
Although the duality proof from Section 6 holds for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), the proof given in this section actually only holds for ρ ∈ (−∞, 0). There is a footnote marking the exact point where this proof breaks down for ρ > 0.
We now define a stronger version of group domination that will relate usefully to LAF. Let M i = {j ∈ M : w ij > 0} be the set of goods that agent i cares about.
Definition B.1 (Strong group domination). Let
Normal group domination would only require that there exist a single (j, τ ) pair where this inequality is strict; a ≻≻ i b requires that there exists such a τ for every good j that agent i cares about. Just like for normal group domination, we can assume without loss of generality that when a ≻≻ i b, min(a k , b k ) = 0 for all k ∈ N : were this not the case, we could simply set Proof. By definition, if agent i is locked, there exists a ≻ b which is strict at (j, x ij + ε) for all j ∈ M i and sufficiently small ε > 0. Clearly this implies a ≻≻ i b.
If the allocation itself is locked, then there exists a ≻ b which is strict at (j, τ ) for every τ ∈ (0, max i x ij ]. Thus a ≻ b is strict on every good that any agent cares about, so a ≻≻ i b for every agent i.
≥0 such that i∈{1...d} y i = i∈{1...d} z i , and for every τ ∈ R ≥0 , i∈{1...d}:v i ≥τ (y i − z i ) ≥ 0. Then for any weakly decreasing function g :
If g is strictly decreasing on [0, max(v) + 2], and ∃τ i∈{1...d}:v i ≥τ (y i − z i ) > 0, then the above inequality is strict.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that
for every τ . We will prove by induction on k that i:
In the base case, k = 1 so the sums are vacuous and both equal 0. For the inductive case, assume the statement holds for k − 1. Then,
using the inductive hypothesis, equation (1), and g(·) ≥ 0. Finally, plugging in k = d + 1, we obtain i∈{1...d}
again by equation (1) and g(·) ≥ 0. Finally, note that if g is strictly decreasing and ∃τ i∈{1...d}:v i ≥τ (y i − z i ) > 0, then at the inductive step where v k−1 < τ ≤ v k , the inequality becomes strict and is propagated upwards to
Lemma B.3. Suppose a ≻≻ i b for some agent i in allocation x. Then for any strictly increasing function g :
Furthermore, the inequality is strict for all j ∈ M i .
Proof. Let v = (x 1j . . . x nj ), y = a, and z = b. Since a ≻≻ i b, we have i a i = i b i and i:x ij ≥τ (a i − b i ) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ R ≥0 . If j ∈ M i , there exists τ for which this inequality is strict. Finally, define the strictly decreasing (on [0, max(v) + 2]) functioñ
and the inequality is strict if j ∈ M i .
One useful case of Lemma B.3 is when g is the identity function, in which case the lemma implies that the aggregate allocation of a is more than the aggregate allocation of b.
Lemma B.4. Suppose a ≻≻ i b for some agent i in allocation x. Then for any strictly decreasing function g :
Proof. Let v = (x 1j . . . x nj ), y = a, and z = b. Since a ≻≻ i b, we have i a i = i b i and i:x ij ≥τ (a i − b i ) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ R ≥0 . If j ∈ M i , there exists τ for which this inequality is strict. Lemma B.2 then gives the desired result.
We are now ready to move on to the main lemma (Lemma B.6). Recall L'Hôpital's rule:
Lemma B.5 (L'Hôpital's Rule). Let g 1 : R → R and g 2 : R → R be functions, and let I ⊂ R be an open interval containing point c. Suppose all of the following hold:
1. Both g 1 and g 2 are differentiable at all points in I except possibly c. Let g ′ 1 and g ′ 2 denote their derivatives.
3. Either lim x→c g 1 (x) = lim x→c g 2 (x) = 0, or both of those limits diverge.
The limit lim
exists, and
6 uses a technically involved argument with L'Hôpital's rule playing a crucial role to show that we can indeed improve the CES welfare of any allocation x where a ≻≻ k b, as long as
Since ρ < 0, this is saying that agents in a overall have more utility (exponentially weighted by ρ) than agents in b, which we might expect since a ≻ b. The proof of the main theorem involves showing that i∈N (a i − b i )u i (x i ) ρ > 0 is impossible, and then applying Lemma B.6. The assumption that w ij ∈ {0, 1} is only used in the final theorem; Lemma B.6 does not require it. This is important, as we will also use Lemma B.6 in other settings (Section B.2).
The proof of Lemma B.6 involves several steps:
1. Given a vectors a, b and an agent k where a ≻≻ k b in allocation x, we will define a new allocation x ′ where we take a fraction of the bundles of agents in a and distribute it among agents in b, giving a little bit extra to agent k (who may or may not be part of a or b). Specifically, we let x ′ ij = (1 − δa i + δb i )x ij for i = k, and x ′ kj = (1 − δa k + δb k + ε)x kj for some ε > 0. Lemma B.3 implies that i∈N (a i − b i )x ij > 0 for all j ∈ M , and thus for small enough ε > 0, x ′ still obeys the supply constraints.
2. We wish to show that this change improves the CES welfare of the agents in b and agent k more than it hurts the CES welfare of agents in a. We will show that this reduces to proving that a particular complicated fraction, which depends on δ, is greater than a value β < 1.
3. We will use L'Hôpital's Rule to show that the limit of this fraction as δ goes to 0 is at least 1, as long as i∈N
4. This will imply that as long as δ is small enough, this fraction will be strictly larger than β, and our new allocation x ′ has better CES welfare than x. Thus x cannot be a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Lemma B.6. Suppose there exists a, b ∈ R n ≥0 and k ∈ N such that a ≻≻ k b in allocation x, i∈N (a i − b i )u i (x i ) ρ ≤ 0, and ρ < 0. Then x is not a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Proof.
Step 1: We reserve the variable k for referring to the specific agent k where a ≻≻ k b. Note that k could be part of a or b, or neither. Recall that M k is the set of goods that agent k cares about. Since a ≻≻ k b, Lemma B.3 implies that i∈N
Thus ε > 0, and for all
For some small δ > 0 to be chosen later, we define a new allocation x ′ by
We will make sure that δ is small enough that (1 − δa i + δb i ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N : otherwise this would not be a valid allocation. We first show that x ′ still obeys the supply constraints, i.e., i∈N x ′ ij ≤ i∈N x ij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M . For all j ∈ M , we have i∈N
Thus x ′ is a valid allocation.
Step 2: We wish to show that Φ CES (x ′ ) > Φ CES (x). For brevity, we write u i = u i (x i ) and
. We want to prove that
Since ρ < 0, this is equivalent to showing that i∈N u
If agent k did not get the boost from the extra δε, her new utility would be (
k be the extra (exponentially weighted in ρ < 0) utility agent k receives from the δε. Since u ′ k > (1 − δa k + δb k )u k and ρ < 0, we have α < 0. For all agents i = k where a i = b i = 0, we have u i = u ′ i . Therefore
19 This is where the proof breaks down for ρ > 0: we would instead have the inequality i∈N u ρ i − i∈N u ′ρ i < 0, which is incompatible with the rest of the proof.
To summarize, we have shown that
If we could show that the right hand side of equation (2) is strictly greater than 0, we would be done, because then i∈N (u
We will do this by showing that
Since ρ is negative and δ, a i , and b i are positive, we have 1−(1−δa i ) ρ < 0 and 1−(1+δb i ) ρ > 0. Therefore it suffices to show that there exists a small δ > 0 such that
Let β be the right hand side of this equation. The expression for β is complicated, but the important thing is that since α < 0, and the denominator is positive, we have β < 1. We will show that the limit of the left hand side of equation (3) is at least 1. This will imply that we can pick δ to make the left hand side as close to 1 as we want: in particular, we can make it larger than β.
Step 3: We use L'Hôpital's Rule to compute the limit of this expression as δ goes to 0. Let g 1 (δ) be the numerator of the above fraction, and let g 2 (δ) be the denominator.
Let us confirm that this limit satisfies the conditions of L'Hôpital's Rule. Both g 1 (δ) and g 2 (δ) are polynomials in δ and so differentiable everywhere they are defined. The derivatives are
The derivative of g 2 (δ) is never zero and g 2 is only undefined at δ =
, so we can easily pick an open interval containing zero that does not contain that
. This satisfies the first and second conditions. We observe that lim δ→0 g 1 (δ) = lim δ→0 g 2 (δ) = 0, which satisfies the third condition.
Finally, we can explicit compute the following limit:
where the final inequality follows from the assumption that i∈N
Thus, by L'Hôpital's Rule, we have
Step 4: Now let us put everything together. The above limit implies that there exists δ arbitrarily close to 0 such that the left hand side of equation (3) is arbitrarily close to 1. Since β < 1, there exists δ so that the left hand side of equation (3) is strictly greater than β. Then
> 0. Thus we have shown that if a ≻≻ k b in an allocation x and i∈N (a i −b i )u i (x i ) ρ ≤ 0, there exists another allocation x ′ with strictly better CES welfare. This implies that x was not a maximum CES welfare allocation, which completes the proof.
We just need one more definition before proving the main theorem of this section. We say that a ≻≻ k b is minimal if there do not exist vectors a ′ , b ′ ∈ R n ≥0 and an agent k ′ ∈ N such that a ′ ≻≻ k ′ b ′ , and such that strictly fewer agents have positive weight in a ′ + b ′ . Formally, there should not exist
Note that if there exists any a, b, k such that a ≻≻ k b, there must exist a minimal one, since minimality is defined based on the number of agents involved, which can only take on integral values.
Theorem B.7 states that in the bandwidth allocation setting, any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. The proof involves the following steps:
1. We use Theorem A.2 and Lemma B.1 to conclude that if a maximum CES welfare allocation
x cannot be supported by price curves, there must exist k ∈ N and a, b ∈ R n ≥0 such that a ≻≻ k b in x.
We then show that if
this were true, we could apply Lemma B.6 to show that x cannot be a maximum CES welfare allocation, which is a contradiction.
4. This will imply a ≻≻ k b is not minimal. In fact, since we considered an arbitrary a ≻≻ k b, this will show that no a ≻≻ k b is minimal. But we know that if there exists any strong group domination, there must exist a minimal a ≻≻ k b. This is a contradiction, so x can in fact be supported by price curves.
Theorem B.7. If w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , then for any ρ < 0, every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation, and suppose for the sake of contradiction that x cannot be supported by price curves. Then by Theorem A.2, x cannot be LAF, so either the allocation or some agent k must be locked. Then Lemma B.1 implies there must exist a, b ∈ R n ≥0 where a ≻≻ k b. For brevity we write u i = u i (x i ). Suppose that the utilities in a dominate the utilities in b: that is, suppose that for every τ ∈ R ≥0 , i∈N :u i ≥τ 
We define new weight vectors a ′ , b ′ by
Clearly, every agent in a ′ + b ′ appeared in a + b. However, there must be some agent i with a i > 0 but u i < τ , and thus a ′ i = 0:
Therefore the number of agents with a ′ i + b ′ i > 0 is strictly smaller than the number with a i + b i > 0, so a ′ and b ′ involve strictly fewer agents than a and b.
It remains to show that a ′ ≻≻ k ′ b ′ for some k ′ . We will use two key facts. The first is that since w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j, we have u i = x ij whenever w ij > 0. This is the crucial use of w ij ∈ {0, 1}. Thus by the definition of a ≻≻ k b, we have that for all j ∈ M and all τ ′ ∈ R ≥0 ,
The second key fact is that since i∈N :u i ≥τ (a i − b i ) < 0 by assumption, we have b ′ i < b i whenever u i ≥ τ (along with a ′ i = a i ). Thus for any j ∈ M and τ ′ ≥ 0,
Even though b ′ i < b i , this inequality might not be strict: in particular, if the final summation is vacuous. Recall that M i is the set of goods that agent i cares about. We now need to show that there exists an agent k ′ ∈ N such that for all j ∈ M k ′ , there exists τ ′ where the inequality is strict. This does not necessarily hold for k ′ = k, since M k might have included a good that every agent with a ′ i + b ′ i > 0 had zero weight for. Let k ′ be any agent such that b ′ k ′ > 0. Then we know that u k ′ ≥ τ . Thus for all goods j ∈ M k ′ ,
The reason the inequality is strict here is that we know there is at least one agent, k ′ , in the summation. Thus since b ′ i < b i for all i ∈ N where u i ≥ τ , the inequality must be strict. Therefore for all j ∈ M k ′ , the domination is strict at (j, τ ). Thus a ′ ≻≻ k ′ b ′ . However, since a ′ + b ′ involves strictly fewer agents than the arbitrary a + b we started with, no strong group domination can be minimal. This contradiction completes the proof.
B.2 Other settings where the maximum CES welfare allocation be supported
In this section, we give two other settings where any maximum CES welfare allocation be supported: (1) when there are two agents and their weights have the same L q norm for any single q ≥ 1 or the same L ∞ norm (Theorem B.8), and (2) for any number of agents when j∈M w ρ ij = 1 for every agent i (Theorem B.9).
Theorem B.8 implies the CES welfare allocation can be supported exactly when agents' weights are L ∞ normed. This is in contrast to max-min welfare (for any number of agents), where the best we can could do under the L ∞ norm was an arbitrarily close approximation. In fact, the only way the norm is used in the proof of Theorem B.8 is to show that if a ≻≻ k b (without loss of generality, say a contains only agent 1 and b contains only agent 2), then u 1 (x 1 ) ≥ u 2 (x 2 ). One imagines that this property would hold for any reasonable norm.
Theorem B.8. Let n = 2, and suppose that either (1) there exists q ≥ 1 such that j∈M w q ij = 1 for both i ∈ {1, 2}, or (2) max j∈M w ij = 1 for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Then for any ρ < 0, every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We use Lemma B.6. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation, and suppose for the sake of contradiction that x cannot be supported by price curves: then Theorem A.2 implies that x is not LAF, so by Lemma B.1, there exists a, b ∈ R n ≥0 where a ≻≻ k b for some agent k. We can assume without loss of generality that min(a i , b i ) = 0 for both i ∈ {1, 2}. By symmetry, assume that a 1 = b 2 > 0 and a 2 = b 1 = 0. This means that a only contains agent 1 and b only contains agent 2. In order to apply Lemma B.6, we need only show that i∈N (a i − b i )u i (x i ) ρ ≤ 0. In our case, this is equivalent to u 1 (x 1 ) ρ ≤ u 2 (x 2 ) ρ , which is in turn equivalent to u 1 (x 1 ) ≥ u 2 (x 2 ).
Recall that for all j ∈ M , x ij = u i (x i )w ij . Since a ≻≻ k b, x 1j ≥ x 2j for all j, which implies u 1 (x 1 )w 1j ≥ u 2 (x 2 )w 2j . Thus either u 1 (x 1 ) ≥ u 2 (x 2 ) or w 1j > w 2j for all j. However, if agent 1's weight vector is strictly larger than agent 2's on every coordinate, they clearly cannot have the same L q norm for any q, which contradicts the assumption.
Theorem B.9. Suppose that w ij > 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , ρ < 0, and j∈M w ρ ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We again use Lemma B.6. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation that cannot be supported by price curves: then Theorem A.2 implies that x is not LAF, so by Lemma B.1, there exists a, b ∈ R n ≥0 where a ≻≻ k b for some agent k. Since ρ < 0, g(x) = x ρ is a strictly decreasing function. Thus by Lemma B.4, for all j ∈ M we have i∈N (a i − b i )x ρ ij ≤ 0, and for each j ∈ M k , the inequality is strict. Summing over all j ∈ M gives us j∈M i∈N
We again have x ij = u i (x i )w ij , and so j∈M i∈N
Therefore i∈N (a i − b i )u i (x i ) ρ < 0, so Lemma B.6 applies, and this shows that any maximum CES allocation can be supported by price curves. Example 2: An instance where it is necessary to give a price of zero to some goods (which is a form of weakly increasing price curves) in order to support the maximum Nash or CES welfare allocation. Nash welfare is maximized by splitting good 1 evenly between the two agents, and allowing agent 1 to purchase an equal quantity of good 2. This only possible if the price of good 2 is zero: otherwise, agent 1 is paying more than agent 2. It can be verified that this same allocation is also the maximum CES welfare allocation for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1). For another interpretation, recall that the Fisher market equilibrium prices are the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare: thus the price of good 2 being zero corresponds to the fact that the supply constraint for good 2 is not tight in this instance.
C Counterexamples
We showed in Section 6 that if w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , then for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪(0, 1), every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. One natural question is whether this result holds if we only assume that max j∈M w ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . The answer is no, unfortunately, as demonstrated by the following theorem. Theorem C.1 only rules out ρ in the range ( 1 2 , 1), but we conjecture that counterexamples exist for all ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1).
Theorem C.1. For agents with Leontief utilities where max j∈M w ij = 1 for all i ∈ N , for every ρ ∈ ( 1 2 , 1), there exist instances where no maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. Consider the following instance with two goods and three agents, whose weights are given by the following table: agent 1 agent 2  good 1  4  0  good 2  0  4  good 3  1  2  good 4  2  1 Example 3: For two agents with linear utilities, group-domination-freeness is not sufficient for the existence of price curves. Consider the instance where the agents' weights are given as above and the available supply of each good is 1. Define x by x 11 = x 13 = x 22 = x 24 = 1 and x ij = 0 otherwise. This allocation is EF and GDF. To see that x cannot be supported by price curves, letj = arg min j∈{3,4} f j (1). Ifj = 3, then the cost of good 3 is at most the cost of good 4, so agent 2 would buy good 3 instead of buying good 4. Similarly, if j = 4, then the cost of good 4 is at most the cost of good 3, so agent 1 would buy good 4 that instead of buying good 3.
C.1 Difficulties in analyzing linear utilities
We assumed throughout the paper that agents have Leontief utilities. One natural question is whether our results extend to other classes of utilities: in particular, linear utilities. The answer is no, in general. A linear utility function is defined by
where w ij is still the weight that agent i has for good j.
Leontief utilities have the very nice property that agents always purchase goods in a fixed proportion. It does not matter exactly how the cost within each bundle was distributed across goods, because each agent will always purchase goods in the same proportions, regardless of the underlying costs. We do not have this luxury with linear utilities. In this setting, the proportions in which each agent purchases goods depend on a complex interaction between her values for the goods, and the price curves. This makes it very difficult to reason about what agents will purchase given a set of price curves. In fact, each agent's optimization problem arg max
may not even be convex. Thus in order for (x, f ) to form a price curve equilibrium for linear utilities, a complex set of conditions would need to be satisfied. We note that C f (x i ) = 1 is still necessary, and so GDF is still a necessary condition (for strictly increasing price curves), but it is certainly not sufficient (Example 3).
D Omitted proofs
Lemma 4.1. Given price curves f , x i ∈ D i (f ) if and only if both of the following hold: (1) C f (x i ) = 1, and (2) there exists j ∈ M such that for all ε > 0, f j (x ij + εw ij ) > f j (x ij ).
Proof. ( ⇐= ) Suppose the above conditions hold, but x i ∈ D i (f ). Then there exists x ′ i ∈ D i (f ) such that u i (x ′ i ) = u i (x i ) + ε for some ε > 0. Since we assume that x i,j is proportional to w ij , agent x must receive at least εw ij more of each good j in order to increase her utility by ε. Furthermore, since price curves are increasing, f j (x ′ ij ) ≥ f j (x ij ) for every good j. However, condition 4.1 above implies that there exists a good j such that
and thus
which contradicts x ′ i ∈ D i (f ). ( =⇒ ) Now suppose that at least one of the two conditions of the lemma does not hold. If C f (x i ) = 1, then either C f (x i ) > 1 and the cost exceeds the budget, or C f (x i ) < 1 so by continuity agent i could purchase more of every good and increase her utility. Either way x i ∈ D i (f ). Thus assume that for every j, there exists an ε j > 0 such that f j (x ij + ε j w ij ) = f j (x ij ). Then consider the bundle x ′ i defined by x ′ ij = x ij + ε j w ij . This bundle has the same cost as x i , but
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that max j∈M w ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists an allocation x that can be supported by price curves where
Proof. Let w ′ ij be rescaled versions of w ij so that they are L q -normed for a q to be chosen later. Specifically, let α i = ( j∈M w In particular, let x * be the allocation maximizing max-min welfare with the respect to the true weights w ij : then min i∈N α i u i (x i ) ≥ min i∈N α i u i (x * i ). Since u i (x * i ) ≥ Φ M M (x * ) by definition, we have min i∈N α i u i (x i ) ≥ Φ(x * ) min i∈N α i .
Therefore for all k ∈ N , α k u k (x k ) ≥ Φ(x * ) min i∈N α i . Therefore
min i∈N α i α k and so Φ M M (x) ≥ Φ(x * ) min i∈N α i max i∈N α i
It remains to show that there exists q ≥ 1 such that min i∈N α i max i∈N α i ≥ 1 − ǫ. This follows from the fact that lim q→∞ α i = ( j∈M w q ij ) 1/q = 1 for all i ∈ N , which completes the proof.
